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SANBORNTON AND MORALES: 
THE TWO FACES OF "ENVIRONMENT" 
By Richard F. Babcock"" 
This is a tale of two lawsuits, of two communities, and of the 
opinions of two federal courts, a thousand miles from each other, 
the consequences of whose respective judgments are a light year's 
distance apart. The two decisions highlight the ironies and the 
potential conflicts between two movements which are occupying 
the attention of significant portions of our society. 
One of these movements is represented by the current opinion, 
largely white and middle-class, that we are so far down the path to 
annihilation of our physical environment that it is ridiculous to 
talk of social problems: we are, in short, witness to a debacle in 
our physical surroundings. The other movement, less popular but 
equally impressive in rhetoric (if not in results), is represented by 
those who state that, until our society can provide adequate shelter 
reasonably close to decent employment, all talk about "environ-
ment" is nothing more than a white, middle-class diversion de-
signed to prevent others from enjoying the perquisites of the white 
middle-class. 
As with so many movements of these sorts, each is dominated by 
its zealots. Each has within it enough truth to require serious study 
if we are to achieve an endurable and equitable society. 
SANBORNTON, NEW HAMPSHIRE 
Steel Hill Development, Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton! involves a 
rural community in New Hampshire. The description of that town 
by Chief Judge Coffin is so evocative that it would be pointless 
to paraphrase: 
Located in the rolling hills of Belknap County, New Hampshire 
is the tiny town of Sanbornton with a year-round population of ap-
proximately 1,000 persons living in some 330 regular homes. Long 
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popular as a major recreational and resort area, Belknap County 
commenced to share its rural beauty with visitors in considerably 
greater degree with the opening in the 1960's of Interstate Highway 
93 which funneled droves of touring urbanites from the Boston area, 
one hundred miles away, into towns like Sanbornton. Since San-
bornton borders Lake Winnisquam, is within easy reach of Lake 
Winnipesaukee and affords simple access to most New Hampshire 
ski areas, it is no surprise that its summer population is about 2,000 
persons, that it has around 400 seasonal homes, and now is afforded 
the unique opportunity to serve as a seasonal second home paradise 
for persons who would buy the proposed 500 to 515 family units 
planned by appellant Steel Hill Development, Inc. In short, as the 
district court stated, 'this case reflects the current clash between those 
interested in opening up new and hitherto undeveloped land for 
sale and profit and those wishing to preserve the rural character of 
Northern New England and shield it from the relentless pressure 
of an affluent segment of our society seeking new areas for rest, relaxa-
tion and year round living.' 
Steel Hill Development, Inc. bought 510 acres in Sanbornton in 
December, 1969. It planned construction of second homes in a 
combinat~on of cluster development and conventional detached 
single-family houses. At the time that Steel Hill acquired its acre-
age the property was zoned to require a minimum of approximately 
35,000 square feet of land per single family house. According to 
the court, negotiations between Steel Hill and the Town were at 
first "cordial." At least that was the case until the first public hear-
ing to consider a proposed rezoning which would have permitted 
some clustering. A substantial number of local residents attended, 
and were bitterly opposed to the proposal. The local planning board 
nevertheless approved 37 conventional houses on 35,000 square foot 
lots. Then came the reaction and (as any student of the phenome-
non of zoning could have foreseen) here followed a rezoning of 
Steel Hill's property: seventy percent of Steel Hill's land was re-
classified "Forest Conservation District," six acres minimum per 
house, and thirty percent was classified "Agricultural District," 
three acres minimum per house. Steel Hill sued and, as is expected 
in such matters, alleged that there was no relationship between the 
zoning classifications and the "health, safety, morals and general 
welfare" of the community; that the regulations were in violation 
of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment (that is, the re-
zoning so reduced the value of its land as to constitute taking with-
out compensation); and that the classification of its land violated 
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the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire 
found adversely to Steel Hill on all counts.2 On appeal, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit recognized the context 
in which this opinion was being decided: 
This court, like other federal and state courts throughout the country, 
finds itself caught up in the environmental revolution. Difficult and 
novel legal and factual questions are posed which require the resolu-
tion of conflicting economic, environmental, and human values. The 
problem inherent in quantifying a 'way of life,' [citing case] or the 
beauty of an unspoiled mountain, [citing case] may never be solv-
able with any degree of certitude. 
Neither the appellate court nor Steel Hill spent much time on 
the minimum three-acre zoning. The six-acre restriction was another 
matter. The trial court had observed that if only "health and 
safety" were to be considered, the six-acre requirement could not be 
justified. The trial court had, however, considered such problems _ 
as the potential for the pollution of neighboring lakes, increased 
traffic problems, increased air pollution and "interference with 
smelt spawning in Black Brook." "Several witnesses," the trial 
court found, "testified not only would the town's rural character 
be destroyed by Steel Hill's massive plans, which would, in effect, 
double the town's population, but that there could be immeasur-
able ecological harm." 
Steel Hill attorneys had read the latest cases in which local regu-
lations had been successfully challenged on the ground they were 
socially and economically "exclusionary."3 The appellate court dis-
cerned a difference between rural New Hampshire and the suburbs 
of Philadelphia: 
All these cases refer to an unnatural limiting of suburban expansion 
into towns in the path of population growth where a too restrictive 
view of the general welfare was taken. Comment, 50 Journal of Urban 
Law 129 (1972). Instead, appellant here does not seek to satisfy an 
already existing demand for suburban expansion, but rather seeks to 
create a demand in Sanbornton on behalf of wealthy residents of 
Megalopolis who might be willing to invest heavily in time and 
money to gain their own haven in bucolic surroundings. Note, 57 
Iowa L. Rev. 126, 127 (1972). These different problems of suburban 
and rural expansion, their scientific and legal analyses, and their 
appropriate solutions cannot so easily be equated. 
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The appellate court sustained Sanbornton's midnight zoning, but 
this approval was not unreserved. The court cautioned the com-
munity: 
Yet, though it may be proper for Sanbornton to consider the 
foregoing factors, we think the town has done so in a most crude 
manner. We are disturbed by the admission here that there was never 
any professional or scientific study made as to why six, rather than 
four or eight, acres was reasonable to protect the values cherished by 
the people of Sanbornton. On reviewing the record, we have serious 
worries whether the basic motivation of the town meeting was not 
simply to keep outsiders, provided they wished to come in quantity, 
out of the town. We cannot think that expansion of population, even 
a very substantial one, seasonal or permanent, is by itself a legitimate 
basis for permissible objection. Were we to adjudicate this as a re-
striction for all time, and were the evidence of pressure from land-
deprived and land-seeking outsiders more real, we might well come 
to a different conclusion. Where there is natural population growth 
it has to go somewhere, unwelcome as it may be, and in that case 
we do not think it should be channeled by the happenstance of what 
town gets its veto in first. But, at this time of uncertainty as to the 
right balance between ecological and population pressures, we can-
not help but feel that the town's ordinance, which severely restricts 
development, may properly stand for the present as a legitimate stop-
gap measure. 
The court concluded by suggesting that Sanbornton plan with 
more precision for the future, and that the New Hampshire legis-
lature undertake to assist small towns like Sanbornton to do a 
better job of developing local land use policies. 
Thus, while we affirm the district court's determination at the pres-
ent time, we recognize that this is a very special case which cannot 
be read as evidencing a general approval of six-acre zoning, and that 
this requirement may well not indefinitely stand without more home-
work by the concerned parties. 
Sanbornton is one of those cases where the losing party looks for 
solace in the rationale, and the winning party, exuberant over the 
result, worries how seriously it should take the hortatory language 
that preceded the affirmation. 
HARVEY, ILLINOIS 
The presumptive companion case, which appears so unlike the 
circumstances in Sanbornton, is Momles v. Haines. 4 The suit was 
762 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 
brought by Mrs. Morales because the City of Harvey had refused 
to issue a permit to build a house subsidized under Section 235 
of the Federal Housing Act5 even though her development met all 
applicable zoning regulations. Mrs. Morales had entered into a 
contract to purchase a house to be built by a contractor which had 
already constructed four hundred Section 235-financed houses in 
Harvey. All, or substantially all, of those houses had been occupied 
by Blacks. Harvey, Illinois is located in Cook County, south of 
Chicago, near Gary, Indiana. It is a city of moderate and low-
income families; an "ethnic" community in the current phrase. 
In 1960 the total population of Harvey was 29,071, of which 6.8 
percent were Black. In 1970 the population was 33,864, of which 
30.9 percent were Black. Mrs. Morales is a Black citizen of the 
United States. 
In the summer of 1970, the City of Harvey, by informal ad-
ministrative rule, decided the city would not allow any more homes 
subsidized under Section 235 to be built within the city's limits. 
The city began to deny permits. On September 27, 1971, the City 
Council adopted Resolution No. 868 which gave formal recognition 
to this informal decision. That resolution read as follows: 
WHEREAS, it is deemed for the best interest of the City of Harvey 
not to issue more permits for this type of low construction housing 
for the following reasons: 
A. It is a concentration of too much low cost housing to one city. 
B. This type of construction can only mean slums in the city. 
C. Building of these homes has discouraged other builders to 
build better homes in the City of Harvey. 
D. These homes lower the land values of other residents in the 
City of Harvey. 
James Haines, the Mayor of Harvey, testified that Harvey's 
Black population was "integrated with white population rather 
than segregated." He also stated "that the city hoped that, if Section 
235 homes were delayed for a period of time, some of those which 
were to be built would be built in other communities rather than 
in the City of Harvey." 
The trial court found that the city's refusal to issue a building 
permit for a Section 235-financed home violated the equal protec-
tion clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because such houses 
are physically indistinguishable from other houses in their price 
category, which the city allows to be built. The court concluded: 
" ... in view of the foregoing it is unnecessary to decide whether 
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the decision to ban additional Section 235 houses was motivated 
to any extent by the likelihood that such houses would be occupied 
by blacks or by a desire to control 'racial balance.' " 
CONCLUSIONS 
What can be extracted from these two cases? May one conclude 
that the relatively affluent may legally keep out other relatively 
affluent (Sanbornton), but that the relatively poor cannot keep out 
other relatively poor (Morales)? 
Or that Babcock's Law of the Second Gas Station is once again 
demonstrated to be ubiquitous in its application; that, in order to 
exclude development of the kind that you do not wish, you must act 
promptly and not allow any change from what has existed previ-
ously.6 Is it easier to keep out the first Section 235-financed house 
than the four hundred and first? 
Or that there is a different constitutional standard for a second 
home than for a first home; that in balancing the equities between 
the desire of a community to maintain its "character" and a plea 
for additional housing, the latter argument is not persuasive when 
that plea is made by a white stockbroker in Boston hunting a week-
end retreat, but is persuasive when it is made by a low-income Black 
in Cook County seeking to find a permanent shelter outside the 
ghetto of the central city? 
Or that Steel Hill made a threshold error in not joining as in-
dividual plaintiffs three Black doctors from Boston who sought 
second homes, or in failing to include a few subsidized units for 
low-income families who would service the affluent occupying the 
development? 
On the other hand, did Harvey make a fatal mistake in its 
candor? The resolution of the Harvey council was blunt to the 
point of embarrassment. Should it not have taken a lesson from 
the Town of Sanbornton and used its codes as the exclusionary 
device? Why did not Harvey insert provisions in its zoning ordi-
nance, subdivision ordinance, or its building code, that would have, 
by raising costs, effectively prevented construction of Section 235-
financed housing, and yet would have appeared to be neutral-to 
be applicable to all housing, subsidized or market? 
What does the future hold for each of these two disparate com-
munities? I picture Sanbornton taking Judge Coffin's warnings to 
heart. The Town takes a clue from the decision of the New York 
Court of Appeals in Golden v. Town of Ramapo/ and sketches 
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out a fifteen to twenty-year capital improvements program and no 
development is permitted until the streets, sewers and parks are 
provided, as promised in the capital budget. Thus the town of 
Ramapo cannot be accused of exclusion; it is simply "staging" 
development; meanwhile, no development is permitted. Ramapo 
has complied with the decision of Judge Coffin to do something 
more than "crudely" zone everything minimum six acres. Having 
undertaken that step Sanbornton would have temporized, and 
might hope that Steel Hill and its progeny will turn elsewhere to 
look for more seducible areas in New England, or that an economic 
depression will cool the Boston affluent. 
The prospect facing Harvey, Illinois is less predictable. Another 
federal judge, in Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority)8 held 
that when the Black population of a neighborhood reached ap-
proximately 25 percent, the neighborhood had "tipped" and would 
inexorably move in the direction of being totally occupied by the 
particular racial group. Harvey is past that tipping point. It faces 
the prospect of becoming all, or substantially all, Black. The mem-
bers of the Harvey city council probably had not read Gautreaux) 
but they knew instinctively what it said. Harvey, unlike Sanborn-
ton, was ten years to late. The ironies in Morales are underscored 
by the representation. Mrs. Morales was represented by counsel 
provided by the Leadership Council for Open Communities, a 
Chicago area organization dedicated to establishing greater oppor-
tunity for low and moderate income housing throughout the entire 
metropolitan area, and currently concerned with trying to work 
out some "fair share" voluntary method whereby all suburban 
communities would take a share of the housing necessary to provide 
lower-income people adequate shelters near their jobs. I venture 
that Mrs. Morales' lawsuit was not undertaken without consider-
able anguish by the Leadership Council. They knew what Harvey 
feared; it was a result they were dedicated to avoiding. Yet they 
took Mrs. Morales' case. I suggest that the Council's decision to 
take this case was correct. Mrs. Morales wanted a house outside the 
Chicago ghetto; she thought she was able to get one in Harvey. 
She didn't care about "fair share" or other fantasies. Probably she 
also wanted a house where she would not be an isolated Black in a 
sea of white neighbors. Let us further presume that the conse-
quence of Morales is that Harvey will go all Black. Is this bad? 
Certainly not from Mrs. Morales' point of view. Should Mrs. 
Morales be denied sophisticated legal assistance by a white liberal 
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legal assistance organization because that organization recognizes 
the validity of the proposition that there is a correlation between 
inadequate public services and the racial makeup of a neighbor-
hood or community and that the present Black residents of Harvey 
would be the ones to suffer most if they lost all or substantially all 
of their white population? 
What possible arguments or techniques might Harvey have fol-
lowed which could have saved it from the consequences of Morales? 
I earlier suggested that Harvey should have hidden its real motives 
beneath a maze of "neutral" land use regulations, all allegedly de-
signed to protect the health and safety of any resident, irrespective 
of race or economic class. (Worse luck, there are no "spawning 
smelt" in Harvey.) Harvey overlooked a number of ploys. Under 
the 1970 Illinois Constitution, Harvey enjoys home rule. Why not 
amend its charter to require a referendum before any further 
subsidized housing was authorized? This would have brought into 
play the constitutional imperatives that surround the franchise 
and it would have permitted the community to invoke the rule of 
James v. Valtierra.9 
As an alternative, Harvey, being a suburb of Chicago, should 
have known that Judge Austin still had before him, in a companion 
case to Gautreaux) the question of whether his restriction on public 
and subsidized housing in Chicago should not be extended to the 
suburbs. Why not ask the judge in Morales) Judge Tone, to defer 
any decision in Morales until Judge Austin had acted on the peti-
tion that an equitable plan for low-income housing be developed 
for all Chicago suburbs? The point, of course, could then have 
been advanced that Harvey had passed the "tipping" place, pre-
cisely what Judge Austin was seeking to put a stop to in his judg-
ment order in the first Gautreaux decision. Harvey, the plea would 
go, should be protected from becoming the suburban ghetto 
(thereby relieving the other communities of their obligations) until 
a court-imposed plan had been written for the entire metropolitan 
area. 
Finally. if Harvey felt sufficiently frustrated to put a stop order 
on all Section 235-financed housing, one wonders why the city did 
not join as third-party defendants the Governor of Illinois, the 
State Superintendent of Education, and every member of the state 
legislature. Harvey could plead that under the present tax system 
more low-cost housing imposed relatively higher costs on the educa-
tional system in Harvey than in more affluent suburbs; that under 
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the 1970 Illinois Constitution the responsibility for education is 
clearly upon the state; that the State of Illinois had, by its dis-
criminatory method of disturbing educational funds, contributed 
to the special fiscal problems that Harvey faces and therefore the 
State of Illinois was guilty of a denial of equal protection of the 
law. Until the state acted, Harvey, being only an agent of the state, 
could not be held solely responsible for assuming the consequential 
burdens that were a result of the state's nonfeasance. 
Environment in Sanbornton and Harvey? For whom? For the 
residents of Sanbornton it is the rural beauty and the unsubdivided 
hills. For Mrs. Morales it is a modest home, yet near other Blacks, 
free of rats and lead-paint walls. For the leadership of the City of 
Harvey, it is a stable community, predominantly white, but with 
a substantial percentage of Blacks, and free of blockbusters and 
more white flight. For Steel Hill, it was an opportunity to develop 
land and make a profit. 
Mrs. Morales won and meanwhile has found herself other ac-
commodations. Sanbornton won what may be no more than a fleet-
ing victory. The City of Harvey lost and can only hope to be 
saved by some doctrine of fair share that has as yet to establish 
itself. Steel Hill lost, at least until it finds another, less determined 
community. And two federal courts surely must wonder why they 
are expected to jerry-build an equitable system of land use policy. 
It does seem that there should be a happier way to treat mobile 
Boston stockbrokers and Chicago Blacks, threatened New Hamp-
shire valleys and white ethnics. 
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